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DISINFORMATION AS WARFARE IN THE DIGITAL AGE: 
DIMENSIONS, DILEMMAS, AND SOLUTIONS
Minna Aslama Horowitz
INTRODUCTION: AGE-OLD WEAPONRY 
DIGITIZED
The vast majority of conflicts today are not fought by nation states and their 
armies; increasingly, they are fought not with 
conventional weapons but with words. A specific 
sort of weaponry—“fake news” and viral 
disinformation—has been at the center of policy 
discussions, public debates, and academic analyses 
in recent years. Some suggest that 
the turning point for the current 
global epidemic of disinformation 
started with a physical armed 
conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine in 2014 (e.g., Khaldarova 
& Pantti, 2016). Others note that 
unverified reporting by the New 
York Times during the Iraq War 
qualifies as fake news, and that, 
in fact, Octavian’s propaganda 
campaign against Mark Anthony, 
in 44 BC, is an example of the 
same broad phenomenon (Posetti 
& Matthews, 2018, July 23). To be sure, in the 
world of communication and media content, fake 
news and propaganda are nothing new.
Yet the developments of the past few years 
seem to have surprised and shocked journalists, 
politicians, policymakers, technologists, scholars, 
and audiences alike. This may simply be a result 
of so-called “techno-utopian” thinking, which 
predicted that the internet would create new kinds 
of democratic practices, including networked 
publics and deliberative processes (e.g., Erickson 
& Aslama, 2010), even in the global public sphere 
(Castells, 2008). However, this turned out not be 
the case.
One of the few dissidents of the techno-optimist 
era, Evgeny Morozov, foresaw today’s challenges 
in his book, The Net Delusion: The Dark 
Side of Internet Freedom (2011), in which he 
points out that technology, including digital 
communications tools and networks, is neutral; 
the very same tools that enable connections and 
participation can be used for misinformation and 
surveillance. Morozov may not, however, have 
quite imagined the extent of the 
problems of today’s media and 
communication landscape. It is 
telling that the very term “fake 
news” is being used both as a 
description of a phenomenon and 
as a political propaganda tool. 
In addition, what has been called 
the “emerging information arms 
race” (Posetti & Matthews, 2018, 
July 23) is plaguing mature and 
emerging democracies alike. 
As it is with “traditional” 
war and warfare, so it is with 
communication weaponry: things are messy, and 
there is no one reason for the disorder and no 
one frontier on which battles are waged. Not 
every weapon is equally powerful, not everyone is 
equally vulnerable, and no single act can diffuse 
the war. This article seeks to summarize the 
complex contexts, definitions, and manifestations 
of the current disinformation landscape. It suggests 
an analytical framework, the “circuits of power” 
(Clegg, 1989), to illustrate how information wars 
impact those most vulnerable, to showcase some 
suggested solutions, and, ultimately, to highlight 
the responsibility of multiple levels of participants 
in a democracy.
“Yet the developments 
of the past few years 
seem to have surprised 
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FROM ARRESTED WARS TO SURVEILLANCE 
CAPITALISM TO CIRCUITS OF POWER: 
DIMENSIONS OF DISINFORMATION
What makes today’s context particularly 
challenging is that old forms of propaganda, 
including editorial decisions, are now combined 
with human influencers and opinion makers, viral 
online sharing, and the automated content creation 
of disinformation (Nedeva, Horsley, & Thompson, 
2018). On one hand, digital communication 
has created a new landscape of “Arrested War” 
(O’Loughlin & Hoskins, 2015, January 14). The 
current situation can be seen as a continuum in the 
relationship between wars and media coverage. 
For instance, the broadcast era was defined by 
agenda-setting and gatekeeping by large national 
news organizations. The following phase featured 
citizen journalists and networked communication 
for dispersed understandings of war. Today, the 
battle over meanings and representations is back 
and, hence, a heightened need for, and creation of, 
disinformation:
It is not just that media has enclosed war 
within its infrastructure. Media arrests war. It 
stops war escaping—escaping unintelligibility, 
escaping mainstream coverage, escaping the 
control of military commanders. To arrest is to 
seize, or to stop or check. To arrest is also to 
attract the attention of. Those protagonists we 
would expect to be operating in hard-to-reach 
places—such as IS—seek the attention of the 
most open and popular channels and spaces. 
They are drawn to the mainstream media 
ecology because it has re-asserted its function 
as primary channel of the world’s affairs. 
(O’Loughlin & Hoskins, 2015, January 14)
On the other hand, disinformation can be seen as 
a byproduct of a different kind of war, one that is 
fought in an attention economy (e.g., Wu, 2016), 
under the conditions of so-called “surveillance 
capitalism” (Zuboff, 2015). Here, search engines 
and social media platforms make money de facto 
by selling predictions based on the data they 
collect.
These two phenomena, as separate as they may 
seem, are both the cause and the manifestations 
of the same societal trends. In general, there are 
several interconnected broad developments: As 
societies, and individuals, we have witnessed a 
shift in our relationship with knowledge; that 
is, common ideas of objectivity and “truth” are 
not prominent in public debates. This is coupled 
with a cultural shift that is marked by distrust 
in elites and institutions, whether political, 
journalistic, or scientific. More broadly, cases of 
deep dissatisfaction in existing political actors, 
systems, and structures are continuously emerging. 
The economic conditions of the media and 
communication markets are marked by fierce 
competition. Technological advances have fostered 
fragmentation among media publics and created 
information habits based on algorithms, micro-
segmenting, and viral content sharing, usually 
among peers and closed groups (McNair, 2018).
Still, the question of disinformation in today’s 
media landscape cannot be easily grouped into 
neat empirical categories, for analytical analysis, 
or for concrete policy actions to curb fake 
news. Several high-level, multi-country, multi-
stakeholder efforts, as well as numerous academic 
and applied research projects, have attempted 
to address these multiple phenomena that are 
related to disinformation and its dissemination, 
from a variety of angles, including intent, action, 
and type of content. The thinking and definitions 
around the various dimensions of these complex 
challenges reflect the authors’ expertise and 
concerns. 
For instance, the way Facebook defines the 
phenomena of fake news is threefold (Derakhshan 
& Wardle, 2017). First, there are “Information 
(or Influence) Operations,” which are actions 
taken by governments or organized non-state 
actors to distort domestic or foreign political 
sentiment, most frequently to achieve a strategic 
and/or geopolitical outcome. These operations 
can use a combination of methods. There is also 
“False News,” or news articles that purport to 
be factual but contain intentional misstatements 
of fact to arouse passions, attract viewership, 
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or deceive readers. Finally, one can identify 
“False Amplifiers,” meaning coordinated activity 
by inauthentic accounts that has the intent of 
manipulating the political discussion.
A policy brief by the London School of Economics 
(Tambini, 2017) discusses several content 
categories: alleged foreign interference in domestic 
elections through fake news; new advertisement 
models that open new opportunities for people to 
make money through the peddling of fake news; 
parody and satire; bad journalism; news that is 
ideologically opposed; and news that challenges 
orthodox authority. A report for the Council of 
Europe (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) targeted 
at researchers and policymakers discusses an 
“information disorder framework.” This model 
includes (1) types of information disorder based 
on intent, ranging from unintentional false content 
to disinformation (i.e., false or manipulated 
content and context, or a broader social use with 
false content and the intent to harm). In this 
framework, one can also distinguish (2) the phases 
of information disorder (i.e., creation, production, 
and distribution). Finally, one can distinguish (3) 
the elements, meaning the agents (i.e., who created 
the message and why?), the message (i.e., what was 
the content?), and the interpretation (i.e., how was 
it interpreted?).
The European Union (EU) multi-stakeholder 
High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on Fake 
News and Online Disinformation (European 
Commission, 2018) discusses in its report three 
main aspects of current disinformation landscape 
beyond false news. It first addresses the problem 
of fabricated information blended with facts and 
practices that go well beyond anything resembling 
news. This category includes automated accounts 
with networks of fake followers; fabricated 
or manipulated videos; targeted advertising; 
organized trolling; and visual memes. The report 
also addresses an array of digital behavior that 
is more about the circulation of disinformation 
than it is about the production of disinformation, 
including posting, commenting, sharing, tweeting, 
and retweeting. Finally, the dimension of 
stakeholders is discussed, which includes state or 
non-state political actors, for-profit actors, citizens 
individually or in groups, and infrastructures of 
circulation and amplification (including news 
media, platforms and underlying networks, and 
protocols and algorithms).
The above examples illustrate the variety of 
approaches that a study by the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre (Martens, 
Aguiar, Gomez-Herrera, & Mueller-Langer, 
2018) summarizes as follows: The narrow 
approach focuses on verifiably false information. 
Fact-checking can expose false news items and 
identify the sources of these articles. This form 
is easy to identify and can be countered by, for 
example, hiring fact-checkers, tagging suspicious 
postings, and removing false news posts. The 
broad approach, in contrast, pertains to deliberate 
attempts at the distortion of news to promote 
ideologies, confuse, and create polarization, as 
well as disinformation for the purpose of earning 
money but not necessarily of causing harm. While 
much of this can be politically motivated, these 
attempts can take a form of clickbait practices and 
the intentional filtering of news for commercial 
purposes, to attract particular audiences. This 
approach is harder to empirically study and verify, 
and it pertains to the economic models of news 
markets and variations in the quality of news. 
One could label the more limited phenomenon as 
“disinformation” and the broader understanding 
as “information disorder,” which has multiple 
causes and manifestations (e.g., Wardle & 
Derakhshan, 2017).
Yet another approach, applied in the present 
article, is to view the vast issues and dimensions 
related to disinformation and information disorder 
as being manifested in different levels of the 
“circuits of power” (Clegg, 1989). In its original 
form, the theory of circuits of power is about the 
context in which power is being used and in which 
it potentially appears. The first circuit is the overt, 
or macro-level, one of (political) decision-making 
power. The second is the systemic-economic 
circuit of power that contextualizes policy-making 
decisions, including the power of institutions. The 
third, social, circuit describes cultural meanings 
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created by individuals and groups—elements that 
also provide context to the macro-level circuit.
This framework, used to look at disinformation 
and information disorder, could be seen self-
evident. Within media and communication 
studies, especially within its critical strands, 
the creation, dissemination, and interpretation 
of information and representations have, for 
decades, been associated with power—whether 
the question is about the role of the media and 
media institutions in societies (e.g., Curran, 
2002), or about the use of language for power 
in mediated contexts (Fairclough, 1995). It 
is often expressed as an ideological struggle 
over meanings. In other words, in both Clegg’s 
analytical framework, and critical media studies, 
power is relational and always in flux, contested, 
and perhaps especially poignantly in this case. As 
an obvious example, the micro-level circuit level, 
even if made vulnerable by structures and certain 
platforms, also uses the power to create and share 
disinformation extremely effectively. A prime 
example of this power struggle is the concept of 
fake news, its meanings ranging from weaponized 
political rhetoric, to an analytical definition of the 
phenomenon, to value-laden political rhetoric.
As applied in the case of disinformation and 
information disorder, the circuits of power can 
function as an analytical framework as follows:
• A macro-level concern about societal 
structures, power interests, and the 
governance of power, including media and 
communications policy-making; 
• A meso-level modality of legacy media 
institutions and different (more or less 
institutionalized) digital hubs and platforms 
for the distribution and sharing of content; 
and
• A micro-level activity in which 
disinformation is seen as actions (i.e., 
creation, interpretation, and sharing) by 
people as individuals or collectives.
IMPACT: VULNERABILITIES AND FAKE NEWS
Circuits of power as an analytical model is 
especially useful when assessing the positions 
of, and impact upon, those who are the most 
powerless and vulnerable; vulnerability in an 
individual (at the micro level) is reflected in—and, 
many would argue, very often produced by— 
societal structures and failures of institutions. 
Macro Level: Vulnerable Societies
Information disorder seems to impact most 
nations. Famously, research has confirmed the 
impact of targeted political advertising as well as 
disinformation during the 2016 United States (US) 
elections, although the impact of disinformation 
upon the actual election results seems much 
weaker than public speculation has suggested 
(Alcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Guess, Nyhan, & 
Reifler, 2016.) Similarly, in the United Kingdom 
(UK), the parliamentary committee investigating 
fake news raised concerns of voter targeting in the 
Brexit referendum (Pegg & Duncan, 2018, April 
16), and there have been fears of interference in 
several European elections. 
However, a multi-country study on Asia 
(Kaijimoto & Stanley, 2018) showcases how 
different contexts create conditions for different 
manifestations and with different scales of impact. 
For example, while in Japan most problematic 
information seems to stay within certain 
communities and rarely gains traction and in 
South Korea fake news is not a business, in India 
both political and other types of disinformation 
runs rampant, especially on WhatsApp, the 
main gateway for most Indians to the internet. 
Indonesia, too, features successful professional 
fake news and hate speech producers, who create 
made-to-order divisive and sectarian content. In 
the Philippines, threats and intimidation from 
government and nongovernment sources alike 
create a fertile ground for severe information 
disorder and mistrust in institutions.
Unsurprisingly, then, the more volatile and divided 
a society is in political and social aspects, the more 
vulnerable it is to disinformation. This is clear in 
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the case of Central and Eastern Europe, where 
some nations, after building democratic regimes, 
are now bordering on or have become full-fledged 
“illiberal democracies,” that is, democratically 
elected governments that are ignoring the 
constitutional limitations of their reach and, often, 
limiting rights of the citizens (Zakaria, 1997, p. 
22). These countries are also vulnerable to foreign 
influence: The European Journalism Observatory 
notes that especially the Baltic States and Ukraine 
continue to be the targets of permanent Russian 
disinformation attacks (Russ-Mohl, 2018, April 19).
As observed by many others after Morozov, the 
digital weapons of democracy can equally be 
used for dictatorial purposes. It has been argued 
that the Arab Spring is a case that highlights 
this particularly well: dissidents and their 
allies may have been skillful in organizing and 
mobilizing actions via the internet (and especially 
social media), but the same tools were used by 
authorities to crack down on dissident action 
(Maréchal, 2018, November 16).
Meso Level: Vulnerable Institutions
Following Zuboff’s (2015) idea of surveillance 
capitalism, one could claim that media institutions, 
especially social media platforms, are thriving only 
on their ability to target audiences. At the same 
time, they seem to have been—perhaps naively, 
perhaps not—ignorant of the potential dangers 
they could pose.
Facebook is probably the most blatant and the 
most well-documented case. Research by Guess, 
Nyhan, and Reifler (2016) indicates that Facebook 
played an important role in directing people to 
fake news websites during the 2016 US elections. 
They found that heavy Facebook users were 
likely to consume fake news, which was often 
immediately preceded by a visit to Facebook. 
Facebook is also the central player in the viral 
spread of disinformation and hate speech in 
Myanmar (e.g., McLauglin, 2018, July 6) and Sri 
Lanka (e.g., Taub & Fisher, 2018). In Brazil, both 
Facebook and WhatsApp are part of information 
disorder (e.g., Phillips, 2018, October 10).
Facebook’s attempts to curb viral falsehoods, 
ranging from setting up fact-checking operations 
to collaborating with academics (Lyons, 2018, 
June 21) do not seem to have been very effective 
thus far. Ironically, it has been revealed that in 
2018, Facebook started a public relations (PR) 
war against its own critics. One of the main targets 
was the billionaire George Soros. This occurred 
after Soros had criticized Facebook in early 2018 
and noted that Google and Facebook exploit the 
social environment by being de facto monopolies 
and by reaching out to markets in countries that 
might not adhere to the democratic use of the 
media: “people without the freedom of mind can 
be easily manipulated” (Soros, 2018, January 25). 
Unfortunately, the PR retaliation by Facebook 
fueled, perhaps unintentionally, the spread of anti-
Semitic disinformation about Soros (e.g., Bowles 
& Wichter, 2018, November 22). 
One could perhaps conclude that, if the intention 
of platforms such as Facebook is indeed to foster 
democratic communication, their technological 
structures and business models—under the 
conditions of surveillance capitalism that they 
themselves created—make them the vulnerable, 
unwilling middle-men of information disorder. 
The other alternative, the prioritization of revenue 
over human rights and security, is an unfortunately 
dark scenario.
However, the institutions that are truly vulnerable 
in this situation are legacy media organizations. 
They are increasingly dependent on the same 
platforms that spread digital disinformation. A 
recent study by the Pew Research Center indicates 
that approximately one third of news audiences 
in the global North and global South visit social 
media daily to get their news (Poushter, 2018, 
October 25). It is no surprise that the new digital 
attention economy has changed the journalism 
business, a process that Franklin (2014) has called 
the crises of “Financial Viability” and “Civic 
Adequacy.” The conditions of the media landscape 
have prompted battles for audiences that, in turn, 
have resulted in increasingly polarizing coverage 
and clickbait intended to drive traffic to their 
online and mobile portals. Journalism paywalls 
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have begun pay off to some big players, such as 
the New York Times (Lee & Molla, 2018), but 
such paywalls may keep some news consumers 
out. Recent research indicates that because news 
companies rely on Facebook for their audience, 
they continue to be trapped in the attention 
economy; if they were to abandon social media 
platforms, they would lose 
traffic even if they would not 
lose revenue (Myllylahti, 2018). 
Further, current information 
disorder has had a ripple effect, 
resulting in many people having 
very little trust in the media, even 
if such a view is undeserved. The 
Reuters Institute Digital News 
Report 2018 (Newman, Fletcher, 
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 
2018) highlights this shrinking 
trust in online media. Another 
study notes that, although trust 
in traditional journalism seems to be on the rise 
globally, two thirds of all news audiences believe 
media institutions are more interested in big 
ratings, more views, and more website visits than 
they are in reporting (Southern, 2018, January 25).
Finally, national legacy news media are sometimes 
vulnerable because they are more easily controlled 
than are online media. A prime case is that of 
legacy news media in Hungary. As Freedom 
House (2018) reports, “While private, opposition-
aligned media outlets exist, national, regional, 
and local media are increasingly dominated by 
pro-government outlets, which are frequently 
used to smear political opponents.” This case is 
not unique, as it is also occurring in Central and 
Eastern Europe (e.g., Knight, 2018, November 23) 
and elsewhere.
Micro Level: Vulnerable Audiences
To be sure, fake news and related phenomena 
are a real concern for audiences everywhere. The 
Eurobarometer of March 2018 (Eurobarometer, 
2018) reveals that almost 40 percent of Europeans 
come across fake news every day or almost every 
day. More than 80 percent of the respondents 
perceive fake news to be a problem in their 
country and a problem for democracy in general. 
According to the survey of the Reuters Institute 
Digital News Report 2018 (Newman, Fletcher, 
Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018), which 
included 37 countries, more than half of the 
surveyed news audiences agree or strongly agree 
that they are concerned about what is real and 
fake on the internet.
Yet it is those who are the most 
deprived and vulnerable—
whether in terms of social 
standing, access, and/or media 
literacy—who may suffer the 
most from disinformation and 
information disorder. There 
are numerous recent, well-
documented cases to illustrate 
this. Perhaps the most well-
known is the case of the atrocities 
against the Rohingya Muslim 
minority in Myanmar and the role of Facebook in 
facilitating it. Facebook was already used several 
years ago to fuel conflicts between Buddhist and 
Muslim groups, but it seemed that the company 
was more interested in the country as a business 
opportunity and did relatively little to address the 
situation (McLaughlin, 2018). The vast spread of 
hate speech and disinformation became clear in 
2017 when the violence by the military against 
Rohingya Muslims intensified. Facebook was then 
harnessed, as it was the platform unifying citizens 
in a country where a democratic media system was 
being built. Because Facebook is technically merely 
a platform for user-generated content and is used 
by the government to disseminate information to 
the public, it was thus an easily weaponizable tool. 
The United Nations (UN) rapporteurs on human 
rights in Myanmar put it bluntly:
[Social media] has . . . substantively contributed 
to the level of acrimony and dissension and 
conflict, if you will, within the public. Hate 
speech is certainly of course a part of that. As 
far as the Myanmar situation is concerned, 
social media is Facebook, and Facebook is 
social media. (Miles, 2018, March 12)
“…it is those who are the most 
deprived and vulnerable—
whether in terms of social 
standing, access, and/or media 
literacy—who may suffer the 
most from disinformation and 
information disorder.”
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Facebook has since commissioned an independent 
review of the situation and notes that it cannot 
be responsible for the structural challenges of the 
nation (Warofka, 2018, November 5). However, 
whether the platform is responsible or not, very 
similar conflicts between the Buddhist majority 
and Muslim minority also occurred in Sri Lanka, 
also fueled by rumors and disinformation. An 
investigative journalism report concludes the 
following:
Time and again, communal hatreds overrun 
the newsfeed—the primary portal for news 
and information for many users—unchecked 
as local media are displaced by Facebook 
and governments find themselves with little 
leverage over the company. Some users, 
energized by hate speech and misinformation, 
plot real-world attacks. (Taub & Fisher, 2018)
In a vulnerable country on the way to democracy, 
those with a minority standing are an easy target. 
However, vulnerability also comes from limited 
access to a diversity of media and sources; hence, 
those that are prevalent can have an even more 
significant impact. A lack of opportunities to learn 
critical media literacy skills adds to vulnerability. 
Another aspect of vulnerability could be seen as 
geopolitical: in the reviewed cases, those affected, 
even at the country level, may not be considered 
important enough or may not have a loud enough 
voice in global public deliberations for platforms to 
really care and respond in the most efficient way. 
Finally, as studies about the 2016 US election, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, point out, influencers 
(i.e., those with a strong social–political standing 
and media-online presence in any specific 
country or context) are key to the spread of viral 
disinformation (e.g., Lewis, 2018, November 20). 
Those who are being heard in the information 
overflow are powerful; those whose voices do 
not bear weight will be left vulnerable, unable to 
counter disinformation.
RESPONSES: MULTITUDE OF WEAPONS, 
MULTI-LEVEL SOLUTIONS
How do you solve a disorder that is both global 
and national; that relates to both big money 
and inflammatory politics; that involves three 
distinct but interconnected vulnerabilities? There 
are numerous, ongoing attempts being made to 
address policies (at the structural level), media 
organizations (at the institutional level), and media 
audiences (at the consumer level).
Macro Level: “Soft” Media and Communications 
Policies
Information disorder has been recognized to 
be a problem by international policy-making 
bodies. The Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, given to the 
UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, 
recognized this multi-level problem:
Although the Internet remains history’s 
greatest tool for global access to information, 
such online evangelism is hard to find today. 
The public sees hate, abuse and disinformation 
in the content users generate. Governments see 
terrorist recruitment or discomfiting dissent 
and opposition. Civil society organizations 
see the outsourcing of public functions, 
like protection of freedom of expression, to 
unaccountable private actors. . . . The United 
Nations, regional organizations and treaty 
bodies have affirmed that offline rights apply 
equally online, but it is not always clear that 
the companies protect the rights of their users 
or that States give companies legal incentives 
to do so. (United Nations Human Rights 
Office of the High Commissioner, 2018, p. 3)
Numerous inter-governmental bodies have begun 
to give policy statements on global disinformation 
and information disorder. For instance, a Joint 
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and 
“Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda 
[Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), 2017] was produced by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 
JoVSA  •  Volume 4, Issue 2  •  Fall 2019 13Disinformation as Warfare in the Digital Age: Dimensions, Dilemmas, and Solutions
Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe Representative on Freedom 
of the Media, the Organization of American States 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, 
and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information. The Nordic 
Council of Ministers convened its own high-level 
group of key experts and launched a booklet to 
start a discussion about how to counter fakes 
and build trust in words and facts (Lundgren, 
Bjerregård, Mogens, Hanson, & Starum, 2017).
Perhaps the most proactive stance has been taken 
by the EU, with its aforementioned HLEG on 
Fake News and Online Disinformation (European 
Commission, 2018). This multi-stakeholder 
group has come up with five core actions: (1) 
enhancing the transparency of online news; (2) 
promoting media and information literacy to 
counter disinformation; (3) developing tools for 
empowering users and journalists; (4) tackling 
disinformation and fostering positive engagement 
with fast-evolving information technologies; and 
(5) safeguarding the diversity and sustainability of 
the European news media ecosystem. In addition, 
it is important to promote continued research on 
the impact of disinformation in Europe, to evaluate 
the measures that have been thus far taken. 
At the same time, given the global and local 
contexts, today’s situation is seen by many as a 
watershed for media and communication policies 
and regulation: Can policies reframe media 
audiences and communication technology users 
as citizens with rights? Can they help to restore 
citizens’ trust in media and the potential of free 
speech? There is a great fear of overreaching 
in policy-making, which would open doors 
to censorship, or, at the minimum, diminish 
journalistic integrity and autonomy. Strong 
journalistic self-governance codes exist, and 
consequently, some fear also exists that pan-
European efforts, such as the Code of Conduct 
suggested in the EU HLEG report, are potentially 
harmful: “An EU-sponsored ‘Code of Codes’ for 
the whole media universe is not only unnecessary 
and in large parts redundant, at best, but can 
distract attention away from the real causes of the 
problem, while putting additional burden on those 
who are already fighting it” (Reporters without 
Borders [RwB], 2018a, March 12).
Many citizens, however, seem to expect 
governments to implement some governance 
measures. The responsibility for information 
disorder, according to most respondents surveyed 
in the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 
2018 (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, 
& Nielsen, 2018), rests with both publishers and 
platforms. This demonstrates that there is some 
public appetite for government intervention to 
stop fake news, especially in Europe and Asia. 
Those with higher levels of news literacy tend 
to prefer newspaper brands over television 
networks, and use social media for news very 
differently than does the wider population. They 
are also more cautious about interventions by 
governments to deal with misinformation. Similar 
views emerge from the recent Eurobarometer 
(2018). In respondents’ views, journalists, 
national authorities, and press and broadcasting 
management should be the ones mainly responsible 
for stopping the spread of disinformation.
International and intra-governmental “soft 
policy” solutions, rather than new national laws 
and regulatory measures, may indeed be the best 
remedy. National laws pertaining to fake news can 
be a double-edged sword. In Germany, the law 
against online hate speech—the Net Enforcement 
Law (NetzDG)—has caused confusion because the 
very concepts of hate speech and disinformation 
are difficult to apply in practice (The Economist, 
2018, January 13). In Egypt, a law seemingly 
punishing creators of fake news has been used to 
stifle dissent (Michaelson, 2018, July 27).
However, some specific “soft policy” ideas, if 
not measures, remain in the works. The Council 
of Europe is currently (as of November 2018) 
working on its report and policy statement on 
the role of public service broadcasting (PSB) in 
tackling disinformation and information disorder. 
Its foci are not only fact-checking but also the 
ideal of quality journalism, media literacy, and 
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universal reach, via innovations and multi-
platform presence—in essence, features that are 
included in the EU HLEG recommendations. 
Similar kinds of solutions are envisioned in the 
recent policy brief by the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU, 2018) and in other countries, such as 
Canada (McGuire & Cormier, 2017, February 9).
Meso Level: Public Media and Collaborations
Both the Council of Europe (Aslama Horowitz, 
2018) and the EBU (EBU, 2018) suggest that 
PSB and its multi-platform version, public service 
media (PSM), offer one institutional, meso-level 
remedy. This solution to “internet-gone-wrong” 
may not be that far-fetched: as Curran (2012) 
pointed out, American and, later, European 
counter-cultural ideals, as well as a European 
public service ideology, significantly impacted 
internet development. Further, as a recent Pew 
Research Journalism & Media study (Mitchell et 
al., 2018, May 14) documents, in Europe, where 
the public media tradition is the strongest, the 
most trusted media, from television to online 
content, are those run by PSB organizations.
It has been frequently noted that PSB and media 
are, as institutions, part of the media policy 
toolkits that can counter market-driven challenges 
such as the concentration of ownership, increased 
competition, diminishing content diversity, and 
inequalities in access to media (Bajomi-Lazar, 
2017). Information disorder, many scholars 
argue, is the perfect storm of commercialization, 
globalization, and political interference (e.g., 
Martens, Aguiar, Gomez-Herrera, & Mueller-
Langer, 2018)—and the original premise of 
PSB being non-commercial, nation-based, and 
independent is an antidote. Many proponents of 
PSM note that it is needed now more than ever. 
Emily Bell, the director of the Tow Center for 
Digital Journalism at Columbia University, posits 
the following:
Everyone in public service journalism comes 
to work every day with a mission to inform 
the citizens of their country, and to try and 
reach everybody. Even people who can’t pay, 
even people who don’t necessarily think they 
need the news, or people who are left out of 
decision-making because they don’t fit the 
socio-demographic profile that means they 
would normally be included. To me, right now, 
there is almost nothing more important than 
having robust public service media available to 
citizens. ( . . . )
Existing political systems and public service 
broadcasters need to be free to imagine the 
kinds of information ecosystems that they’d 
want at the nation/state level and then real 
freedom to experiment with and find new 
paths to deliver that. And also to think about 
themselves oriented in a world where it could 
well be that large-scale technology platforms—
designed, built, operated in America—will be 
taking over much of what your information 
ecosystem looks like over the next decade. (as 
cited in Hofseth, 2018, April 2) 
The case of disinformation and information 
disorder may also highlight, better than any 
other case, the role of PSB/PSM as a key partner 
in solving global challenges of the media 
landscape in a more localized, contextual manner, 
in collaboration with other trusted partners. 
Collaborations for effective and comprehensive 
fact-checking have perhaps been the most visible 
response by public broadcasters to false content. 
They have engaged in different collaborative fact-
checking efforts, sometimes with their (otherwise) 
competitors.
In Austria, for instance, the public service known 
as the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) 
has joined the effort of a variety of partners in 
raising awareness about fake news, through the 
Austrian Press Agency (APA), of which it and most 
daily newspapers are shareholders.1 In Norway, 
Faktisk.no is an independent fact-checking 
organization, owned by the media companies 
VG, Dagbladet, TV 2, and the public broadcaster 
NRK.2 Following this model, the public services 
Swedish Television (SVT) and Swedish Radio 
(SR), as well as the two largest daily newspapers, 
Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, have 
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started a project to collaborate on fact-checking 
methods and news-spreading during the electoral 
movement. The stakeholders have conducted a 
joint training program for journalists in which 
participants collaborate on fact-checking using 
methods is based on the guidelines from the 
International Fact Checking Network (IFCN). 
Perhaps the most well-known multi-stakeholder 
collaboration is First Draft News, which is hosted 
at Harvard University. The project has more 
than 40 members, including commercial and 
public service media, around the world (e.g., the 
British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], France 
Télévisions, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen [ZDF], 
Deutsche Welle, and Eurovision), not-for-profit 
and de facto public media organizations such as 
Global Voices and ProPublica, and platforms such 
as Facebook and Twitter.3
Micro Level: Media and Information Literacy
How can individuals be protected from 
information disorder? A report by the Columbia 
Journalism Review notes that “Media literacy 
works, and it just might save humanity,” but adds 
that old tools are not enough “when a hacker 
in Macedonia can easily create a website that 
looks legitimate, then quickly make thousands 
of dollars from advertising as bogus stories 
circulate” (Rosenwald, 2017, Fall). In the US, there 
are hundreds, if not thousands, of projects that 
have been set up, or reinvigorated, by the surge 
of disinformation around and after the 2016 US 
elections (e.g., Sullivan & Bajarin, 2018, August 
23). As a result, legislators are on the alert. For 
example, California has passed a law to boost 
media literacy education in schools (Minichiello, 
2018, September 3).
In Europe, media education is often explicitly 
or implicitly mandated, not only for schools 
but also for PSBs. Many have taken on the task. 
For instance, France Télévisions Education has 
a collection of videos about the phenomenon of 
disinformation,4 and the Swiss Schweizer Radio 
und Fernsehen (SRF) “My School” has published 
an educational teaching module specifically about 
fake news.5 Some PSM organizations focus on 
the nature of quality journalism, fact-finding, and 
trust, with a comprehensive approach to media 
and information literacy. The BBC, for example, 
has offered mentoring from BBC journalists, in 
person, online, or at group events, to a thousand 
schools. All schools have free access to online 
materials, including classroom activities, video 
tutorials, and an interactive game called BBC 
iReporter. The game gives the player the chance 
to take on the role of a journalist in the BBC 
newsroom and addresses issues related quality 
reporting and disinformation.6 In addition, a 
Reality Check Roadshow toured the country in the 
UK in Spring 2018, and local schools were able 
to nominate their own students to attend one of a 
dozen regional events.7 
Children and young people, even though they 
are now digital natives, are still vulnerable 
populations, so it is understandable that many 
activities concentrate on media literacy that keeps 
them safe. Fact-checking efforts could also be seen 
as a form of media and information literacy, and 
the aforementioned First Draft News, for instance, 
has engaged audiences directly in a project related 
to the French elections.8 Media development 
projects and activities by international 
organizations are addressing contexts in which 
the structural and organizational vulnerabilities 
are great; as an example, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
UNESCO supports media and information literacy 
in Myanmar to address the inter-cultural challenge 
of hate speech [United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
2018, May 31]. 
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CONCLUSION: INFORMATIONAL WARFARE 
AND MEDIA FREEDOM 
For several decades, we have feared cybersecurity 
and cyberwars in the form of attacks on computers 
to affect central infrastructures, such as energy 
production. Now, however, information warfare 
has become the most prevalent and complex cyber 
weapon. A feature in Foreign Policy in 2018 put it 
succinctly:
The nature of cyberwarfare is that it is 
asymmetric. Single combatants can find and 
exploit small holes in the massive defenses 
of countries and country-sized companies. 
It won’t be cutting-edge cyberattacks that 
cause the much-feared cyber-Pearl Harbor 
in the United States or elsewhere. Instead, 
it will likely be mundane strikes against 
industrial control systems, transportation 
networks, and health care providers—
because their infrastructure is out of date, 
poorly maintained, ill-understood, and often 
un-patchable. Worse will be the invisible 
manipulation of public opinion and election 
outcomes using digital tools such as targeted 
advertising and deep fakes—recordings and 
videos that can realistically be made via 
artificial intelligence to sound like any world 
leader. (Wheeler, 2018, September 12)
While “conventional” cyberwars seek 
infrastructural weaknesses, information wars 
benefit from social, economic, and cultural 
vulnerabilities. Cyberwars and information 
disorder are being manifested in many frontiers 
and for numerous reasons, including monetary 
gain and political power. However, to create 
disinformation and information disorder, one does 
not necessarily need to be a skilled hacker. An 
individual’s frustrations about social and economic 
conditions can turn into the fear, hatred, and 
vitriol that prompt simple acts of digital violence, 
such as creating, commenting on, and sharing 
rumors, falsehoods, and hate speech. Hence, 
information wars have many more soldiers than 
do cyberwars.
This article outlined some macro-, meso-,  
and micro-level vulnerabilities that create 
fertile conditions for rampant disinformation 
and information disorder. It posited that the 
challenge is both global and regional/national, 
both economic and socio-political. There have 
been some policy ideas and implementations, 
institutional activities, and attempts to empower 
individuals to battle information disorder. As is the 
case in terms of the causes, so it is in terms of the 
solutions: everything is interconnected.
However, it seems that two basic—but often 
forgotten—factors determine the resilience 
against fake news. The 2018 Media Literacy 
Index, (Dimitrov, 2018, March 30) compiled in 
European countries by the Open Society Institute, 
recognizes that the media literacy and overall 
level of (and accessibility to) quality education 
is key, but so is the level of media freedom in a 
country. These two factors correlate with one 
another and bring together the macro, meso, and 
micro aspects of vulnerabilities. The challenge 
is, as also documented by RwB, that despite the 
freedom offered by the internet, media freedom 
is shrinking all around the world, and “more and 
more democratically-elected leaders no longer 
see the media as part of democracy’s essential 
underpinning, but as an adversary to which they 
openly display their aversion” [Reporters without 
Borders (RwB), 2018b].
Disinformation as warfare in the digital age may 
not be so different than any other type of warfare; 
wars are fought for power, and some benefit 
economically while the vulnerable suffer the most. 
As Felice (2008) posited in his article, “Moral 
Responsibility in a Time of War,” we often get 
distracted by the problem of “many hands”—that 
is, the causes and solutions are many and complex, 
so the responsibility is not clear. This is clearly true 
with information disorder. However, what makes 
this case special is everyone who is active on 
digital platforms can be responsible in the simplest 
of ways: not lashing out, not commenting, not 
sharing.
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